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Inequality and Wealth Creation in Ancient History: 
Malthus’ Theory Reconsidered 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to propose the hypothesis that inequality was essential for the 
sustainability and ‘development’ of early agriculturally based societies that developed in Prehistory 
and Ancient History. This was so for varied reasons: there was a need for some members of societies - 
the dominant class also called the elite - to escape from the Malthusian trap. In most cases, agriculture 
produced a bigger economic surplus eventually. Managerial problems – such as the ones associated 
with storage, the division of labor, irrigation, trade –being part of the consequences of the Neolithic 
revolution, created pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a process which led 
later to the formation of the early states. This process allowed the appearance of powerful local chiefs 
who changed the nature of their original communities with new forms of social organization, in which 
one individual and his enlarged family - transformed into a ruling elite - received the benefits of the 
labor of a large number of serfs belonging to less-favored communities in neighboring areas. Although 
the surplus appropriated by the elite was used in specific ways – consumption, investments and 
expenditures on armed forces - it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution 
involving unequally distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of 
agriculturally based societies, it is one of main ones as is evidenced by considering six early 
civilizations resulting from the Neolithic revolution. This result involves an important modification of 
Malthus’ theory. However, inequality - though necessary - was not a sufficient condition for the 
sustainability and economic development of these early societies. 
 
Keywords: economic surplus, elite dominance, early civilizations, inequality, Malthus, 
property rights, wealth. 
 
JEL code: N1, N3, E02, O30, P14. 
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Inequality and Wealth Creation in Ancient History: 
Malthus’ Theory Reconsidered 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most controversial issues in economic history is about the population theory of 
Thomas Robert Malthus who in 1798 wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population. 
Implicitly or not, all economic studies on long-term economic development refer to Malthus’ 
theory. For instance in his recent book, G. Clark stated that (2007, p 1) :“Before 1800 income 
per person —the food, clothing, heat, light, and housing available per head—varied across 
societies and epochs. But there was no upward trend. A simple but powerful mechanism 
explained in this book, the Malthusian Trap, ensured that short-term gains in income through 
technological advances were inevitably lost through population growth”. According to this 
view, the crucial factor was the rate of technological advance. As long as technology 
improved slowly, material conditions could not permanently improve, even while there was 
cumulatively significant gain in the technologies. Thus, the average person in the world of 
1800 was poorer than many of their remote ancestors and the quality of life also failed to 
improve on any other observable dimension. 
Various criticisms (both on theoretical and/or empirical grounds) have been made, directly 
and indirectly, of Malthus’ theory. One of our main criticisms of the Malthusian model is that 
it is inconsistent with the empirical evidence for the preindustrial world. Some authors1 
believe that G. Clark’s view about the applicability of Malthusian hypothesis of population 
growth holds for all human history, except for the last 200 years. Clark dismisses many 
empirical studies such as that of Angus Maddison (e.g. 2007) which provided an empirical 
basis for long-run income estimates as inconsistent with the logic of the Malthusian economy. 
Angus Maddison used information on real wages to infer changes in GDP per capita growth. 
As pointed out by Bolt, J. and J. L. van Zanden, (2013, p.12) who followed up A. Maddison’s 
project: “The overall conclusion is however that those pre-industrial societies were able to 
achieve income levels that were much higher than subsistence”, a conclusion that directly 
contradicts Malthus’ theory. 
                                                          
1 E.g. Persson, K. G. (2008). 
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Another criticism of Malthus’ theory is about the role of inequality - mainly income 
inequality - because it was pervasive in the agrarian economies that dominated the world until 
1800. Thus, a central concern is about the consistency of Malthus theory with the existence of 
inequality based on social classes. It is clear that the Malthusian trap belongs to social 
evolutionary theory. In Malthus’ model, the economy of humans in the years before 1800 
turns out to be just the natural economy of all animal species, with the same kinds of factors 
determining the living conditions of animals and humans. Therefore, it is assumed that 
mankind was subject to natural selection throughout the Malthusian era, even after the arrival 
of settled agrarian societies with the Neolithic Revolution. Since the struggle that shaped 
human nature did not end with the Neolithic Revolution but continued right up until the 
Industrial Revolution, one cannot avoid taking into account one of the results of this struggle, 
namely the existence of inequality. Milanovic, B., P. H. Lindert and J. G. Williamson, (2007) 
have extensively studied inequality in 14 ancient pre-industrial societies. These societies 
range from early first-century Rome to India just prior to its independence from Britain. They 
demonstrated that while inequality in historical pre-industrial societies is equivalent to that of 
today’s pre-industrial societies, ancient inequality was much greater when expressed in terms 
of maximum feasible inequality. More precisely, they emphasized the role of the elite in 
creating inequality. Indeed, they stated that (2007, p 28-29):“the extraction ratio – how much 
of potential inequality was converted into actual inequality – was significantly bigger then 
than [it is] now. (…) The ratio shows how powerful and extortionary are the elite, its 
institutions, and its policies”. However, given the lack of data, they do not assess societies and 
civilizations which existed before the Roman Empire. They however offered a conjecture 
about what has happened in these early times (2007, p 5): “Income inequality must have risen 
as hunter-gatherers slowly evolved into ancient agricultural settlements with surpluses above 
subsistence. Inequality rose further as economic development in these early agricultural 
settlements gave the elite the opportunity to harvest those rising surpluses”. It is therefore the 
purpose of the present paper to study the relevance of Malthus’ theory for Neolithic societies 
and for the early civilizations that emerged from the Neolithic revolution taking account of 
such inequality. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers some of the main changes introduced 
by the Neolithic revolution in relation to population and production. A critical assessment of 
Malthusian stagnation is presented in section 3. The central role of property rights in Malthus’ 
model is detailed in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the links, in the economic literature, 
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between inequality and economic growth. These links, and the emergence of a dominant class 
from the Neolithic period, are studied in section 6. Evidence of inequalities in early 
civilizations, as well as evidence of the uses of the economic surplus is presented in Section 7. 
Section 8 is about the sustainability of inequality and its implications for economic growth. 
Section 9 concludes. 
This article mainly presents empirical evidence that several early agrarian societies were able 
to achieve economic growth (and avoid the Malthusian trap) because a dominant class 
appropriated the economic surplus and in particular cases, used it for capital accumulation and 
to promote technical progress. However, the underlying theoretical reasons for this deviation 
from the Malthusian trap are also suggested.  
 
2. Food Production and Population Size during the Neolithic Revolution 
The Neolithic revolution led to major changes in human life. Two of these are the following: 
On the one hand, the amount of food available due to the development of agriculture and 
animal husbandry increased, compared to the available food which could be obtained by 
hunting and gathering. In other words, the Neolithic period is characterized by the emergence 
of an economic surplus provided by agriculture. However, this did not happen suddenly. The 
Neolithic process spanned from 10,000 BP to 3500 BP. Therefore, the potential economic 
surplus from agriculture did not occur instantly but took some time to become available 
because new techniques2 had to be developed and proven. 
On the other hand, the population level increased sharply. Until the beginning of the Neolithic 
period, estimates of world population vary from 5million to over 20 million. But after the 
farming revolution, the rate of growth increased considerably, from 0.0015 percent per annum 
to 0.1 percent per annum3. There were several reasons. By shifting to the agriculture, people 
became settled and therefore were able to have more children. The Palaeolithic hunter-
gathering (denoted by HG in the sequel) groups virtually existed in an equilibrium eco-social 
system; and they were able to control their population in response to variations in food 
supply. Thus, births were normally spaced at 3–5 year intervals among nomadic hunter-
                                                          
2 Such as, for examples, irrigation systems for cultivation, genetic management of plants and animals, the 
development of ploughing techniques. 
3 See Renfrew, C. and P. Bahn, (2012, p 456). 
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gatherers and the maximum potential fertility per woman was reduced to 3–5 children and 
often further diminished by infanticide and high mortality. During the Mesolithic period and 
judging from the number of sites, the population in the Near East started increasing from 
15,000 B.P. with the appearance of Natufian sites. This was marked by an increase in 
sedentariness and a broadened range of subsistence strategies. Later, the birth rate 
dramatically increased with the emergence of agricultural sedentary settlements. This is 
believed to be due to the changed social status of women and to better childcare, combined 
with the larger and more regular availability of a more nutritious food supply. Indeed, because 
labor productivity was higher in farming than in foraging activities, people were better 
nourished. As has been emphasized by Childe (1936, pp. 14, 143), these two consequences of 
the Neolithic revolution supported a substantial increase in human population. Both changes 
induced by the Neolithic revolution, i.e. the largest amount of food resulting from agriculture 
and the increase of the population level, do not occur separately but were connected. Such 
connections could be explained as stated by J. Diamond (1997, p 111) : “In all parts of the 
world where adequate evidence is available, archaeologists find evidence of rising densities 
associated with the appearance of food production. Which was the cause and which the 
result? (…) In principle, one expects the chain of causation to operate in both directions (…) 
That is, the adoption of food production exemplifies what is termed an autocatalytic process—
one that catalyzes itself in a positive feedback cycle, going faster and faster once it has 
started.” 
 
3. Malthusian Stagnation: Theory and Evidence 
Although agricultural food production was during the Neolithic epoch, much larger than could 
be obtained by foraging, many authors4 consider that the Neolithic period cannot be seen as a 
period of economic growth by modern standards. In their views, the evolution of economies 
over the major portion of human history (i.e. until the 18th century Industrial Revolution) was 
actually marked by Malthusian Stagnation. Technological progress and population growth 
were miniscule by modern standards and the average growth rate of income per capita in 
various regions of the world was even slower due to the offsetting effect of population growth 
on the expansion of resources per capita. In other words, as pointed out by T. Malthus (1798), 
                                                          
4 See e.g. Galor, O. (2005) or Ashraf, Q and O. Galor (2011). 
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for thousands of years, humans were subjected to persistent struggle for existence and 
therefore survival necessitated a “perpetual struggle for room and food.” Resources generated 
by technological progress and land expansion were channeled primarily towards an increase 
in the size of the population, with a minor long-run effect on income per capita. According to 
this literature5, the evolution of population and output per capita across most of human history 
was consistent with the Malthusian paradigm. The positive effect of the standard of living on 
population growth along with diminishing labor productivity kept income per capita in the 
proximity of a subsistence level. 
However, the above stated vision associated with Malthusian stagnation is subject to some 
weaknesses or shortcomings.  
First, and as we will see in more details in the sequel of this paper, a problem with the recent 
literature on Malthusian Stagnation is its failure to take account of class inequality in some 
societies during the Neolithic period and thereafter. In prehistory and early history, the 
common people were subject to Malthus’ theory but not the elite. Life was not short and 
dismal for all. While an increase in per capita food availability was eventually made possible 
by agriculture, there is no evidence that this increase was on such a large scale and combined 
with other social changes to trigger a demographic transition, that is to place a brake on 
population growth. That being so, one is left with the query of why was the growing potential 
economic surplus not frittered completely away by the increased population levels as 
predicted by the Malthusian theory? We claim that this was because in some societies, 
significant class inequality emerged. These societies were characterized by a dual class 
structure consisting of a relatively small dominant class and a large dominated class. The 
former appropriated a proportion of the output produced by the dominated class. Depending 
on the amount of output appropriated from the dominated class, this restricted their rate of 
population growth given that they tended to reproduce in accordance with the Malthusian 
theory. 
Secondly, and even though it is difficult to know how to measure technological progress 
adequately, considerable progress was made in the Neolithic period, related to genetic 
selection of cultivars, agricultural management techniques, to the taming of animals for draft 
work (…) and, later, the working of metals. Therefore, and has demonstrated by E. Boserup 
(1965) for more recent agrarian economies, food supply increased to accommodate population 
                                                          
5 Galor, O. (2005), G. Clark (2007), Ashraf, Q and O. Galor (2011). 
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growth. Indeed, as a population found that it was approaching food shortages, it would 
identify ways of increasing supply by means of new technology, better seeds, new farming 
methods and so on. In other words, in the long run, the growth of the population is not 
restricted by the amount of food produced by agriculture. 
Thirdly, possibly human development in early history should not be judged by increases in 
average income per head. An alternative might be to consider advances in knowledge, in 
communications and transport as signs of development. For example, the development of 
writing was a very important innovation as were developments in numbering systems. There 
were many other innovations in early history such as in metal working and significant 
engineering feats6. Social innovations also occurred. The accretion of knowledge tends to be 
cumulative, and is greatly assisted by systems which enable it to be recorded and 
disseminated. This is a vast improvement on oral transmission of knowledge, as far as 
prospects for economic and cultural development are concerned. We know that many early 
societies supported a priestly or intellectual class associated with their dominant persons, and 
that they were responsible for considerable advances in knowledge. They provided the 
original basis for many of today’s knowledge-based economies. In many cases, even 
knowledge that did not add much to productivity may have eventually been useful. Therefore, 
the origin of knowledge in early history shows that it was the appropriation of the economic 
surplus (i.e. the existence of income inequalities) that enabled scribes, priests and other people 
belonging to the elite to add to knowledge. This would not have been possible if Malthus’ 
theory had applied to all. 
The above critique is similar to R. Brenner’s (1976) interpretation of the processes of long-
term economic change in late medieval and early modern Europe. He rejects the rigid 
Malthusian theory based solely on the laws of supply and demand and introduces class 
struggle as the key element in European pre-industrial economic history. In doing so Brenner 
rejects the views of Malthusian historians7 for whom long-term movements in prices, in 
income distribution, in investment, in real wages, and in migration are dominated by changes 
in the growth of population. R. Brenner defines the “class struggle as the conflictive class 
relations over property, i.e. the appropriation of the production surplus” (1976, p.32). 
                                                          
6 However, advances in knowledge did not always result in immediate applications. For instance, Early Greeks 
used steam power to create motion in toys but did not put steam into practical use.  
7 E.g. M. M. Postan (1973, p 32), “Behind most economic trends in the middle ages, above all behind the 
advancing and retreating land settlement, it is possible to discern the inexorable effects of rising and declining 
population”. 
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Possible outcomes of such conflict could include the creation of new “property relations” or 
the reaffirmation of the old institutions. 
4. Malthus’ Model and Property Rights 
It appears that Malthus’ conclusions about economic stagnation are very dependent on the 
implicit assumption made about the existence of property rights, and therefore about the 
existence of inequalities among individuals. 
Malthus’ Model as an Open-Access Model – Scramble Competition 
The Malthusian stagnation can in fact be represented as a special case where there are no 
property rights. In other words, it is associated with open-access to resources, especially land 
available for agriculture, and leads to scramble competition8.With a resource available in 
fixed quantities – i.e. land and therefore the global amount of food resources – the population 
increases until it reaches an equilibrium where the per capita availability of the resource 
equals the subsistence level – the latter being defined by the quantity of food resource 
required by each individual in the population to survive. However this equilibrium is unstable 
and any shock (e.g. on the total of food resources) can lead to extinction of the population. 
The previous result (i.e. food resource or income per head above the subsistence level being 
not sustainable in the long run) explains why Malthus has suggested diverse policies in order 
to control the growth of population. 
Contest Competition and Implications for Wealth Creation 
With the development of agriculture – and the emergence of an elite – property rights were 
implemented, especially with respect to land ownership. It seems likely that significant 
changes in social organization occurred in many societies following their transition from H-G 
mode of earning a living to agriculture. This probably was not immediate but gained 
momentum as the potential economic surplus made possible by agricultural production 
increased. The main social change was the emergence of greater social inequality and the 
emergence of a dominant class. This class extracted a surplus from those dominated and its 
position was maintained by force. It used its power to enforce property rights and acquire 
these. The rule of law - as we know it today - hardly existed (C. A. Tisdell, 2013).  
                                                          
8C. A. Tisdell (2013, 143-49). See also C. A. Tisdell (2005, Ch. 1). 
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Therefore, competition during this epoch is better described by contest competition rather 
than by scramble competition. Under contest competition, individuals are stake out rights to 
the limited available resources, i.e. land and the food resources it provides. Contrary to the 
scramble competition case, if the initial population exceeds the carrying capacity, the whole 
population will not perish; the equilibrium associated with an income per capita equal to the 
subsistence level is stable under contest competition. If some inequalities exist among 
individuals, e.g. if some individual (e.g. the elite) have territories (or land ownership) 
providing food resources in excess of their subsistence level, then it adds to the sustainability 
because it acts as a buffer against external (negative) shocks such as environmental changes. 
North, D.C. and R.P. Thomas, (1977) offer a theory of modern economic development that 
falls within the category of "social institutional theory" rather than demographic theory. But 
whereas R. Brenner (1976) finds primary causal importance in the institutions that define 
local class relations (a Marxian idea), North and Thomas argue that property relations that 
create the right kinds of incentives will stimulate rapid economic growth (a Smithian idea). 
They find that this is the innovation that took place in England in the early modern period; for 
them, it was the creation of capitalist property relations that stimulated economic growth. 
 
5. Inequalities and Growth in the Economic Literature 
The links between inequality and economic growth have been extensively studied in the 
economic literature. Three main approaches exist: the traditional, the recent and the Classical 
ones. 
The traditional – or neoclassical - viewpoint dominated the field of macroeconomics and 
economic growth until late 1980s. It suggests that income distribution has no significant effect 
on macroeconomic activities and economic growth. As pointed out by G. Bertola et al. (2006, 
p x), “In contrast to its paramount importance in nineteenth-century classical economics, 
however, income distribution became a topic of minor interest in recent decades. (…) While 
early growth models in the post-Keynesian tradition were still strongly concerned with 
distributional issues, subsequent “new classical” theoretical developments removed 
distribution from the set of macroeconomic issues of interest”. The observed relationship 
between inequality and economic growth was interpreted as capturing the effect of the growth 
process on the distribution of income, rather than the effect of the distribution of income on 
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the growth process. This viewpoint is exemplified by the representative agent approach to 
macroeconomics. 
A more recent view of development9 (from the 1990s onwards) considers that equality in 
sufficiently wealthy economies stimulates investment in human capital and in individual 
specific projects, and enhances economic growth. In other words, the replacement in modern 
economies of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as the prime 
engine of economic growth has changed the perceived qualitative impact of inequality on the 
process of development. 
The classical viewpoint considers that inequalities have a positive impact on economic 
growth. This seems to be especially true in early stages of development – as during the 
Neolithic revolution and for early civilizations - as physical capital accumulation is a prime 
source of economic growth, inequality enhances the process of development by channeling 
resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher, i.e. to the 
elite.However, whether economic growth eventuates at all depends on what the elite do with 
their appropriation. Particularly in the early Neolithic period, the sustainability of the 
dominant class could depend on how they balanced their appropriation between consumption, 
investment and expenditure on armed forces. 
The previous three approaches demonstrate the changing attitudes of economists to the role of 
inequality in fostering economic growth. In fact, the perceived role of inequality in fostering 
economic development has altered with the stage of economic development and social 
change. The classical position was probably appropriate in early times. It is less relevant now. 
For modern economies, like the US economy from the beginning of the 20th century, 
inequality in the distribution of land ownership adversely affected the emergence of human 
capital promoting institutions (e.g., public schooling) and thus the pace and the nature of the 
transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the emergence of the 
great divergence in income per capita across countries10. New institutions such as limited 
liability companies have also made a difference. For one thing, inequality now is to a greater 
extent based on ‘merit’ rather than on force and inheritance as it was in the past. Furthermore, 
in higher income countries, Malthus’ theory no longer applies and factors like human capital 
and equality of opportunity have become more important.  
                                                          
9 O. Galor (2005). 
10 O. Galor, O. Moav and D. Vollrath, (2009). 
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However, this conclusion is challenged for economies in early stages of development, like 
during the Neolithic revolution and for early civilizations. Indeed, in the earliest context in 
which agriculturally-based societies had to struggle for their existence, inequality based on the 
power of the dominant class was vital for their survival and for the nature of their economic 
development. Societies11 where this pattern did not prevail were easily crushed by others or 
failed to show any significant material development. 
 
6. Economic Surplus and Inequalities from the Neolithic Period 
From the previous sections of this paper, we have seen that two schools of thought attempt to 
explain major economic transformations. One describes these in terms of facts about 
population, while the other argues that the central causal factors have to do with social 
institutions (social-property relations and institutions of political power). The demographic 
theory focuses its attention on the factors that influenced population growth, including 
disease; the social institutions theory focuses attention on the institutional framework within 
which the economic actors (elite, farmers and craftsman or the dominated class) pursue their 
goals. The first one involves an application of a biological or ecological theory, emphasizing 
common and universal demographic forces; the other is based on a social theory emphasizing 
contingency and variation across social space. 
The links between inequality and economic growth assumed by the classical economists can 
be applied to the Neolithic period. In particular, the role of the elite and of land ownerships 
seems to be in perfect accordance with the classical point of view. It was not until after the 
Industrial Revolution and demographic transition that inequality became less important (or 
even an impediment to) economic growth12. Prior to this, inequality prevented at least some in 
society not sinking in abject poverty and it was a force for social advancement. 
The Malthusian theory seems therefore not well suited to describe the early stages of 
economic development following the Neolithic revolution. Indeed, another major 
consequence of the Neolithic revolution, associated with the existence of an economic 
surplus, is the increasing social and economic inequalities. Although such inequality existed 
                                                          
11 E.g. the Melanesian society. 
12 However, inequality probably still plays an important role today in economic growth, but this is not the 
purpose of the present paper. 
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in some HG societies (especially in complex13 HG societies where an economic surplus was 
provided by food procurement) it was magnified in most Neolithic societies. Therefore, an 
elite or an upper class, was able to accumulate very large surpluses for discretionary 
expenditure following the agricultural revolution and later development. 
Agriculture and the Emergence of a Dominant Class 
The available archaeological and anthropological evidence strongly suggests that when we 
talk about the Neolithic revolution, the rise of agriculture is associated with the effects of 
political complexity, such as the existence of social classes. Agriculture provides a number of 
preconditions14 for the emergence of states15 as centralized political organizations governing 
over territory. First, HG groups are mostly nomadic whereas, in contrast, agriculture allows 
groups to settle and, hence, to take control over a territory. Second, compared to hunting and 
gathering, agriculture is an extremely efficient mode of calorie production. Hence, agriculture 
allows populations to grow to a size when it becomes meaningful and even necessary to rely 
on more formalized forms of social organization. Third, agriculture and fixed settlements 
enable food storage. Storage of food is linked to important features of the state as it allows 
taxation and subsequently the emergence of division of labor. In HG societies, all members 
are involved in the subsistence economy whereas storage of taxed food allows a part of the 
population to devote their full time to non-subsistence related activities. Thus, storage 
provides the precondition for social classes not directly involved in production such as public 
servants and professional soldiers.  
These arguments imply that agriculture provides the preconditions for the state formation. 
However, the links between the two phenomena run deeper. Often, the Neolithic revolution 
necessitates the emergence of specialized agencies of coercion, i.e. the formation of elite and 
states. Indeed, the population growth following agricultural transition ignites an autocatalytic 
process when population growth creates a pressure for the intensification of the subsistence 
economy which, subsequently, causes further population increase and further production 
intensification. These accelerating pressures for production intensifications have a number of 
important consequences. First, they leave fewer buffers against starvation in bad years making 
collective systems of risk management more attractive. Second, they facilitate resource 
competition - and ultimately, warfare - which fuels group-wide integration and allow efficient 
                                                          
13 For a presentation of complex HG societies, see Price, T. D. and J. Brown (1985). 
14 J. Diamond (1997). 
15 Bockstette, V., Chanda, A. and L. Putterman, (2002). 
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leaders to emerge. Third, they put premium on more sophisticated production technology, a 
development that requires community-wide collaboration. Fourth, they increase the benefits 
of trading and thereby also the transfer of decision-making power to single individuals such as 
the head trader. In sum, managerial problems associated with the consequences of the 
Neolithic revolution create pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a 
process which leads ultimately to the formation of the early states. 
Inclusive versus Extractive Institutions 
Neolithic societies and societies of early civilizations therefore have features characterised by 
exclusive (extractive) institutions. These contrast with their opposite inclusive institutions16. 
Inclusive economic institutions are those that allow and encourage participation by the great 
mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that 
enable individuals to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic institutions must 
feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services 
that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must 
permit the entry of some new businesses and allow people to choose their careers. Extractive 
economic institutions are those which have opposite properties to inclusive ones. They are 
called “extractive” because such institutions are designed to extract incomes and wealth from 
one subset of society to benefit a different subset. 
Although many public services (roads construction, fortifications, irrigation systems…) can 
be provided by markets and private citizens, the degree of coordination necessary to do so on 
a large scale often eludes all but a central authority. The state is thus inexorably intertwined 
with economic institutions, as the enforcer of law and order, private property, and contracts, 
and often as a key provider of public services. Political and economic institutions are 
therefore closely related, and especially so when one considers early civilization.  
Once agriculture developed sufficiently to yield a substantial economic surplus in the 
Neolithic period, most power – public, economic and religious – was concentrated in the 
hands of a few people. This class division appears to have arisen once agriculture developed 
to the stage where economic surplus generated by it was large enough (and storable enough) 
to support towns. V.G. Childe (1936) describes this as the Second Neolithic Revolution, the 
                                                          
16 See Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson, (2012) for a complete treatment of (political and economic) extractive and 
inclusive institutions.  
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first being the commencement of primitive agriculture (or gardening) not yet yielding a 
significant economic surplus. 
7. Inequalities and the Uses of the Appropriated Surplus in Early 
Civilizations 
Many economists have studied and are still studying the causes of economic development, in 
relation with past and recent history. Among the various causes considered, the role of 
institutions became central for the last two decades. For instance D. Acemoglu and J. 
Robinson, (2012, p 97), state that : “Political and economic institutions, which are ultimately 
the choice of society, can be inclusive and encourage economic growth. Or they can be 
extractive and become impediments to economic growth. Nations fail when they have 
extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and 
even block economic growth”. 
However, early civilizations17 are good examples of successful societies with extractive 
institutions. Early civilizations where all laid out on agriculture. The word civilization itself 
comes from the Latin term for city, and in truth most civilizations do depend on the existence 
of significant cities. In agricultural civilizations, most people do not live in cities. But cities 
are crucial because they amass wealth and power, and they allow the rapid exchange of ideas 
among relatively large numbers of people, thereby encouraging intellectual thought and 
artistic expression. Cities also promote specialization in manufacturing and trade and 
encourage the emergence of centers of political power. 
The early civilizations – resulting from the Neolithic revolution - arose in six different sites, 
four of them along the fertile shores of great rivers. At least three and possibly all six of these 
early civilizations arose entirely independently of each other. Having started in 3500 B.P., 
civilization developed in its six initial centers - the Middle East18, Egypt19, northwestern 
                                                          
17 Unlike an agricultural society, which can be rather precisely defined, civilization is a more subjective 
construct. One can define civilizations only as societies with enough economic surpluses to form divisions of 
labor and a social hierarchy involving significant inequalities. Other, however, press the concepts of civilization 
further, arguing, for example, that a chief difference between civilizations and other societies involves the 
emergence of formal political organizations, or states, as opposed to dependence on family or tribal ties. One 
widely agreed definition is based on the fact that most civilizations developed writing. 
18 In Mesopotamia, Sumerians created the first civilization. The Sumerians themselves fell to a people called the 
Akkadians, who continued much of Sumerian culture. Another period of decline was followed by conquest by 
the Babylonians, who extended their own empire and thus helped bring civilization to other parts of the Middle 
East. Thereafter, new invaders, first the Assyrians and then the Persians, created large new empires in the Middle 
East. 
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India20, northern China21 and two in America22 (Central and South; although slightly later in 
time). These areas covered only a tiny portion of the inhabited parts of the world, although 
they were the most densely populated. Such early civilizations, all clustered in key river 
valleys, were in a way pilot tests of the new form of social organization. Only after about 
1000 B.P. did a more consistent process of development and spread of civilization begin - and 
with it came the main threads of world history. However, the great civilizations 
unquestionably built on the achievements of the river valley pioneers, and so some 
understanding of this contribution to the list of early human accomplishments is essential.In 
these societies of all these early civilizations, the elite appropriated part of the economic 
surplus and used it for three main purposes.  
Consumption and Feasting 
Part of the appropriated could be used for unproductive expenditures, such as feasting and the 
consumption of resources, motivated by social competition between local groups who tried to 
achieve dominance over their neighbours. Such expenditures were already existing among 
HG societies – in the form of Kula or Potlatch – and are considered by some authors as one of 
the reasons explaining the Neolithic transition23.  
In the Levant, Sumerian art developed steadily, as statues and painted frescoes were used to 
adorn the temples of the gods. Statues of the gods also decorated individual homes. Sumerians 
developed complex religious rituals and erected impressive shrines and massive towers, called 
ziggurats, that formed the first monumental architecture in this civilization.This is the most 
visible feature that this dead society left behind. The ziggurats demonstrate the existence of a 
highly evolved society existing thousands of years ago in this area, these structures indicate 
that there was social inequality. High class people demanded that they have a place to conduct 
ceremonies and to live well. They wanted to build a great structure so that foreigners would 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19 Egypt was a second center of civilization in northern Africa, along the Nile River. Egyptian civilization, 
formed by 3000 B.P., benefited from the trade and technological influence of Mesopotamia, but it produced a 
quite different society and culture. 
20 A prosperous urban civilization emerged along the Indus River by 2500 B.P., supporting several large cities, 
including Harappa and Mohenjo Daro. 
21 Civilization along the Yellow River (also known as the Huanghe site) in China developed in considerable 
isolation, although some overland trading contact with India and the Middle East did develop. 
22 Two of the south hemisphere's most impressive cultural traditions developed in Mesoamerica (Mexico and 
northern Central America) and in the mountainous Andean region of South America. They are respectively the 
Olmec (1200 to 400 B.P.) and the Chavin (900 to 250 B.P.) 
23 See Bender, B. (1978), or Hayden, B. (1990). 
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be impressed by what they had built. The construction of ziggurats demonstrated that there 
was one person in charge who had great power over the people. 
In the Egyptian civilization, the king, or pharaoh, possessed immense power. Pharaohs had a 
godlike status and built splendid tombs for themselves (the pyramids) from 2700 B.P. onward. 
Egyptian art was exceptionally lively; cheerful and colorful pictures decorated not only the 
tombs but also palaces and furnishings.Most ancient Egyptians were on the poverty line while 
a handful of priest-kings held fabulous wealth. The fortunate members of Egyptian society 
were Pharaoh and his court, his literate administrators and priests and those subordinate to 
them (doorkeepers, soldiers, quarrymen, artists and craftsmen etc). In the elite group, we find 
the use of perfumes, cosmetics, a sit-down toilet, scrolls, oil-burning lamps, footwear, gloves, 
salt and pepper, honey, wines, a chariot, board games, tweezers, spoons, animals, wigs, 
musical instruments, meat, fine clothes, time measurement, servants, slaves, etc. 
Harappan society appears to have been dominated by a powerful priestly class, which ruled 
from the citadel of each capital. The priests derived this control from their role as 
intermediaries between the Harappan populace and a number of gods and goddesses, who 
controlled fertility. 
In northern China, like the elites of many early civilizations, the Shang rulers and nobility 
were preoccupied with rituals, oracles, and sacrifices. In addition to the fertility functions of 
the ruler, the entire elite was involved in persuading spirits to provide good crops and large 
families. Shang artistic expression reached its peak in the ornately carved and expertly cast 
bronze vessels that were used to make these offerings. Offerings included fine grain, incense, 
wine, and animals. 
Little is known about Olmec political structure, but it seems likely that the rise of major urban 
centers coincided with the appearance of a form of kingship that combined religious and 
secular roles. Finely crafted objects decorated the households of the elite and distinguished 
their dress from that of the commoners who lived in dispersed small structures constructed of 
sticks and mud. The authority of the rulers and their kin groups is suggested by a series of 
colossal carved stone heads, some as large as 3.4 meters high. 
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Investments, Productive Expenditures and Produced Public Goods 
The elite also financed some productive expenditures, especially the production of some 
public goods : the irrigation system, the transportation network, the education system (even if 
it was restricted to the elite), science, writing, (...).  
Farming in Mesopotamia, because of the need for irrigation, required considerable 
coordination among communities, and this in turn served as the basis for complex political 
structures. By about 3500 B.P., a people who had recently invaded this region, the Sumerians, 
developed a cuneiform alphabet, the first known case of human writing. Sumerian science 
aided a complex agricultural society, as people sought to learn more about the movement of 
the sun and stars (thus founding the science of astronomy) and improved their mathematical 
knowledge. In other words, Sumerians and their successors in Mesopotamia created patterns 
of observation and abstract thought about nature that a number of civilizations, including our 
own, still rely on.  
The Egyptian economy was more fully government-directed than its Mesopotamian 
counterpart, which had a more independent business class. Government control may have 
been necessary because of the complexity of coordinating irrigation along the Nile. The 
pharaoh initiated gigantic construction projects, was officially the high priest of all of Egypt's 
numerous temples, and maintained a closed government redistributive system based on a well 
organized administration. 
Though hundreds of miles apart, Harappa, Mohenjo Daro, and other urban centers of the 
northern Indian civilization were remarkably similar in layout and construction. Each city was 
surrounded by walls, which extended a mile from east to west and one-half mile from north to 
south. Coordinated construction on such massive scale might have meant an effective central 
government that could organize and supervise the daily tasks of large numbers of laborers. 
The existence of a strong ruling class is also indicated by the presence of large, well fortified 
citadels in each city. These citadels may have served as sanctuaries for the cities' populations 
in times of attack and as community centers in times of peace. 
In Northern China, an organized state existed that carefully regulated irrigation in the fertile 
but flood-prone river valley. By about 2000 B.P. the Chinese had produced an advanced 
technology and developed an elaborate intellectual life. They had learned how to ride horses 
and were skilled in pottery; they used bronze well and by 1000 B.P. had introduced iron, 
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which they soon learned to work with coal. Their writing progressed from scratches of lines 
on bone to the invention of ideographic symbols. Science, particularly astronomy, arose early. 
In Mesoamerica, as religious and political elites emerged, they used their prestige and 
authority to organize the population to dig irrigation and drainage canals, develop raised fields 
in wetlands that could be farmed more intensively, and construct the large-scale religious and 
civic buildings that became the cultural signature of Olmec civilization. An important class of 
shamans and healers attached to the elite organized religious life and provided practical 
advice about the periodic rains essential to agricultural life. They directed the planning of 
urban centers to reflect astronomical observations and were responsible for developing a form 
of writing that may have influenced later innovations among the Maya. From their close 
observation of the stars, they produced a calendar that was used to organize ritual life and 
agriculture. 
Recent discoveries about Chavin civilization demonstrate that the vast site called Caral in the 
Supe Valley had developed many of the characteristics now viewed as the hallmarks of later 
Andean civilization, including ceremonial plazas, pyramids, elevated platforms and mounds, 
and extensive irrigation works. The scale of the public works in Caral suggests a population 
of thousands and a political structure capable of organizing the production and distribution of 
maritime and agricultural products over a broad area. 
Expenditures on Armed Forces 
What role did violence and warfare play in the development process of early civilizations? 
Warfare has been defined as an opportunistic or situational phenomenon. This contention 
appears supported by the some communities exhibited persistently high levels of warfare 
while other were remarkably non-violent. However, after contact, the violent communities 
quickly abandoned warfare and became essentially peaceful in approximately a decade. This 
shows that violent behavior among communities is often the result of people striving to 
achieve certain objectives within the realities they themselves are constructing and 
reconstructing. 
Inequality was vital to the survival of societies which became increasingly dependent on 
agriculture and other industries requiring investments. The dominant class wished to keep its 
power. Furthermore, inequality played an important role in protecting property rights. The 
privileged landholders (with larger than normal estates) kept military forces of their own (and 
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collectively dominated government) which, in many cases, also added to the military forces. 
Defence from external forces (as well as internal ones) absorbed varying amounts of the 
surplus available to the privileged class. Some of the military force was used for territorial 
expansion and the seizure of other resources.Therefore, a part of the elite’s power was used to 
protect its society from invaders. So indirectly, this class ‘protected’ all members of its 
society. Without this system, it seems likely that agricultural societies may have perished as a 
result of invasions.  
For the early Neolithic period, part of the appropriated surplus was already used for 
expenditures devoted to warfare purposes24. Investments in defensive technology would have 
included the time spent in guarding herds and patrolling lands and settlements, an investment 
that leaves few archaeological traces. But the most lasting traces are those left by weaponry 
and fortifications. But the evidence from fortifications is harder to argue away. In the Levant, 
the first village settlement at Jericho, for instance, has been dated to before 9000 B.P., and 
within a thousand years it had grown to a substantial settlement of several hectares of mud-
brick houses with thick walls. The first evidence of the famous city walls comes from the 
early eighth century B.P., and the presence of great water tanks, probably for irrigation, is 
attested from the seventh century. And a massive ditch, thirty feet deep and ten feet wide, was 
dug into the rock without metal tools.  
Later, Sumerian political structures stressed tightly organized city-states, ruled by a king who 
claimed divine authority. The Sumerian state had carefully defined boundaries, unlike the less 
formal territories of pre-civilized villages in this region. The government helped regulate 
religion and enforced its duties; it also provided a court system in the interests of justice. 
Kings were originally military leaders during times of war, and the function of defense and 
war, including leadership of a trained army, remained vital in Sumerian politics. Kings and 
the noble class, along with the priesthood, controlled a considerable amount of land, which 
was worked by slaves. Warfare remained vital to ensure supplies of slaves taken as prisoners 
during combat.  
During periods of weak rule and occasional invasions, Egyptian society suffered a decline, but 
revivals kept the framework of Egyptian civilization intact until after 1000 B.P. At key points, 
Egyptian influence spread up the Nile to the area now known the Sudan, with an impact on 
the later development of African culture. 
                                                          
24 Rowthorn, R. and P. Seabright (2010). 
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By 1500 B.P., one of the tribes in the north China, the Shang, conquered most of the other 
tribes and established a kingdom that would lay out the foundations of Chinese civilization. 
Shang monarchs were served by a sizeable bureaucracy. Most of the peasant and artisan 
populations of the kingdom were governed by vassals. The later depended on the produce and 
labor of the commoners in these areas to support their families and military forces. In return 
for grants of control over varying numbers of peasants, warrior aristocrats collected tribute 
which went to support the monarch and his court. They supplied soldiers for the king's armies 
in times of war, and they kept the peace and administered justice among the peasants and 
townspeople. 
Surplus and Economic Growth 
Once agriculture developed to the stage where it could support towns, the economic surplus 
generated by it was appropriated by a dominant class in pre-industrial societies. This 
appropriation reduced the income (and possibilities for consumption) of the dominated class 
thereby limiting the increase in their population. In other words, the ruling class extracted rent 
from those whom it dominated. In the absence of this extraction, the rent would have been 
frittered away by an increase in the population of the dominated class. For early agrarian 
societies, this provided a mechanism for avoiding the Malthusian trap because the surplus 
could be used potentially by the ruling class to undertake capital accumulation and stimulate 
economic growth. Such concentration of power accelerated capital accumulation in many 
early agrarian societies, as has been observed by Childe (1936, see especially Ch. 9). 
However, as was observed above, the economic surplus appropriated by the ruling class could 
also be used for ostentatious consumption and for provisioning of armed forces, thereby 
limiting the amount available for capital accumulation and economic growth. The ruling class 
was subject to opportunity costs in their allocation of the economic surplus to competing uses. 
Economic growth was weakened if large allocations occurred of the surplus to support 
ostentatious consumption by the ruling class and to provision the army. In the long-term, low 
economic growth would most likely have weakened the power of the dominant class. Some 
early societies or communities clearly faced some very difficult choices. For example, their 
survival in some cases required considerable expenditure on the army to avoid invasion but 
this restricted their economic growth in such cases, and could weaken these societies in the 
long run. The operation of this model also depended on mechanisms to restrict the population 
size of the dominant class or the elite, as is explained below.  
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8. Inequalities and Sustainability 
As seen previously, the sustainability of the dominant class depended on how the surplus was 
used by them. That is, the balance of their expenditure on their own consumption, on 
investment and on armed forces. But the sustainability of the dominant class depended also on 
others factors such as the size of the available surplus which could be appropriated, the ease 
of appropriating it, the size of the dominant class, its attitude to technological change. 
Appropriation of the Economic Surplus 
The fact that cereals (grain) were the early basis of agriculture in Eurasia was advantageous 
for the development of societies basing their economies on grain production. This is because 
cereals are stored relatively easily and transport easily compared to fruit and vegetables. They 
are, therefore, tradable over long distances and so on. They can be collected as ‘taxes’ and so 
on. They can support urbanization. One remaining question is about the way the elite 
proceeded to capture the economic surplus? In the Neolithic economy, where agriculture was 
the main productive sector, it is likely that land ownership was the main mean used by the 
elite. In others words, the elite has implemented property rights on the land in order to capture 
the economic surplus provided by the agriculture sector. Although North, D. C. and R. P. 
Thomas (1977), point out that property rights were essential for the success of agriculture in 
many societies in early times, these were not governed by the law. Both the acquisition of 
property (primarily land), and its retention, relied on the use of force or threatened use of 
force by those laying claim to it. This was, of course, a major economic burden on the 
dominant class and early agriculturally based economies. Later these property rights were 
extended by the dominant class to include most natural resources, particularly minerals. 
Furthermore, ‘royalty and nobles’ established monopolies, e.g. the salt monopoly in China. 
They had many ways to extract income from others. Some commodities were especially 
useful for appropriation, e.g. grains, metals. Inequality extended beyond merely the 
‘ownership’ of land. In many cases, slaves and serfs were ‘owned’ by the privileged class, as 
well as significant buildings and other items, such as trading vessels. 
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The Size of the Elite 
In addition, the grip of the dominant class on power not only depended upon the size of the 
surplus and the balance of their expenditure on various purposes, but on them restricting their 
own numbers. If this did not occur, they became vulnerable to being overthrown for they 
would have had little of their appropriated surplus left for investment and to support armed 
forces. In such cases, it is likely that they would have been replaced by a smaller dominant 
class of invaders or usurpers. They could not let their numbers increase in a Malthusian 
fashion. Hence, strict rules governing inheritance of property and power were applied. 
Therefore, the dominant class limited its growth in numbers in several ways. For example, in 
many cases, inheritance only passed to the eldest son. Also the dominant class could change, 
for example, as a result of foreign invasion or by external conflict. In any case, it is clear that 
without restraining the numbers in the dominant class, the members of it would in all 
probability lose their power. Their power depended on them keeping a surplus available for 
provisioning forces to retain their power and/or to invest. 
The Lack of Innovations and Political Instability 
For Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012) societies featured by strong inequalities or 
extractive institutions cannot lead to sustainable economic growth. Both authors consider that 
(2012, p 165), “Lack of creative destruction and innovation is not the only reason why there 
are severe limits to growth under extractive institutions.  (…) the internal logic of extractive 
institutions plays also a role. As these institutions create significant gains for the elite, there 
will be strong incentives for others to fight to replace the current elite. Infighting and 
instability are thus inherent features of extractive institutions”. In fact these authors are 
considering two separate problems that might explain the lack of sustainability of societies 
featured by extractive institutions. 
On the one hand, economic growth and technological change are accompanied by a process of 
creative destruction. They replace the old with the new. New sectors attract resources away 
from old ones. New firms take business away from established ones. New technologies make 
existing skills and machines obsolete. The process of economic growth and the inclusive 
institutions upon which it is based create losers as well as winners in the political arena and in 
the economic marketplace. Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson, (2012) consider that fear of 
creative destruction is often at the root of the opposition to inclusive economic and political 
institutions. However, this point of view can be challenged. It is the members of privileged 
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class who are responsible for many of our impressive examples of built environments (e.g. 
pyramids, irrigation work) and of many produced and very useful public goods25.Furthermore, 
in war, it was increasingly the case that new technologies, not numbers became decisive. In 
Eurasia, new defence and attack technologies developed fairly rapidly after the agrarian 
revolution. Therefore, historical evidence demonstrates that the elite was not against 
technological change. On the contrary, the elite was encouraging technological change, 
especially in weaponry and other activities in which technological change would provided 
them more efficient means to reinforce their dominance. 
On the other hand, even though extractive institutions can generate some growth, they will 
usually not generate sustained economic growth, and certainly not the type of growth that is 
accompanied by creative destruction. When both political and economic institutions are 
extractive, the problem does not come from the fact that incentives will not be there for 
creative destruction and technological change. The real problem results from the 
arrangements that support economic growth under extractive political institutions because 
they are, by their nature, fragile: they can collapse or can be easily destroyed by the infighting 
that the extractive institutions themselves generate. In fact, extractive political and economic 
institutions create a general tendency for infighting, because they lead to the concentration of 
wealth and power in the hands of a narrow elite.  
Beyond the two problems mentioned previously, the presumed one – fear of technological 
change – and the real one – political instability - there are two distinct but complementary 
ways in which growth under extractive political institutions can emerge26.First, even if 
economic institutions are extractive, growth is possible when elites can directly allocate 
resources to high productivity activities that they themselves control. The second type of 
growth under extractive political institutions arises when the institutions permit the 
development of somewhat, even if not completely, inclusive economic institutions. Even if, as 
explained previously, many societies with extractive political institutions will shy away from 
inclusive economic institutions because of fear of creative destruction, the degree to which the 
elite manage to monopolize power varies across societies. In some, the position of the elite 
could be sufficiently secure that they may permit some moves toward inclusive economic 
institutions when they are fairly certain that this will not threaten their political power. It is 
                                                          
25 See the previous section for various examples of technological changes implemented by the elite in early 
civilizations. 
26 Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson, (2012, pp 105-106). 
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worth noting that political centralization is the key to both ways in which growth under 
extractive political institutions can occur; a situation completely consistent with evidence 
about early civilizations. 
 
9. Concluding Comments 
Two main consequences of the Neolithic revolution were, on the one hand an increase in the 
size of human population and, on the other, an increased economic surplus produced by 
agriculture. Although both factors had mutual influences, this did not lead to the Malthusian 
trap as it is often believed in the economic literature. Indeed, the Neolithic revolution 
involved managerial challenges– such as the ones associated with storage of food, the division 
of labor, irrigation, trade. Given these problems, powerful local chiefs emerged that changed 
the nature of their original communities and developed new forms of social organization, in 
which one individual and his enlarged family - transformed into a ruling elite - received the 
benefits of the labor of a large dominated class.Although the surplus was appropriated by the 
elite and used in specific ways – consumption, investments and expenditures on armed forces 
- it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution involving unequally 
distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of agriculturally 
based societies, it is one of the main ones and is supported by the evidence from the six early 
civilizations which evolved from the Neolithic revolution. This evidence reveals that an 
important modification of Malthus’ theory is required. The nature of the basic socio-economic 
theory underlying these results has been indicated in this paper and it is intended to formally 
model this theory in a later paper. However, inequality - though necessary - was not a 
sufficient condition for the sustainability and economic development of these early societies 
in which political instability was the rule rather than the exception. 
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